In Knowledge Representation, it is crucial that knowledge engineers have a good understanding of the formal expressions that they write. What formal expressions state intuitively about the domain of discourse is studied in the theory of the informal semantics of a logic. In this paper we study the informal semantics of Answer Set Programming. The roots of answer set programming lie in the language of Extended Logic Programming, which was introduced initially as an epistemic logic for default and autoepistemic reasoning. In 1999, the seminal papers on answer set programming proposed to use this logic for a different purpose, namely, to model and solve search problems. Currently, the language is used primarily in this new role. However, the original epistemic intuitions lose their explanatory relevance in this new context. How answer set programs are connected to the specifications of problems they model is more easily explained in a classical Tarskian semantics, in which models correspond to possible worlds, rather than to belief states of an epistemic agent. In this paper, we develop a new theory of the informal semantics of answer set programming, which is formulated in the Tarskian setting and based on Frege's compositionality principle. It differs substantially from the earlier epistemic theory of informal semantics, providing a different view on the meaning of the connectives in answer set programming and on its relation to other logics, in particular classical logic.
Introduction

I am not here in the happy position of a mineralogist who shows his audience a rock-crystal: I cannot put a thought in the hands of my readers with the request that they should examine it from all sides. Something in itself not perceptible by sense, the thought is presented to the reader-and I must be content with thatwrapped up in a perceptible linguistic form. Gottlob Frege, Der Gedanke
In knowledge representation, a human expert expresses informal propositions about the domain of discourse by a formal expression in some logic L. The latter is formulated in a vocabulary for which the expert has an intended interpretation I specifying the meaning of the vocabulary symbols in the domain. It is essential that the human expert understands which informal propositions about the problem domain are expressed by formal expressions of L. The fundamental task of the informal semantics of a logic L, sometimes called the declarative reading or the intuitive interpretation of L, is to provide this understanding by explaining formal expressions of L (or of a fragment of L) as precise informal propositions about the domain of discourse.
In Frege's terms, an informal proposition is a thought in the mind of the expert. It is not a tangible object and is not perceptible by others. To be observed, studied and used, it must be presented in linguistic form. In this paper, we will therefore assume that the domain expert's intended interpretation I maps each vocabulary symbol to some natural language statement that represents the imperceptible "thought" that this symbol is supposed to represent. Likewise, the informal semantics of a logic L is a mapping that, given such an intended interpretation I, assigns to a formal expression ϕ of L a natural language reading I I (ϕ) that captures the meaning of ϕ in I.
We already hint here that natural language is to play a key role in any study of informal semantics. Such use of natural language may be controversial. For instance, Barwise and Cooper (1981) say: "To most logicians (like the first author) trained in model-theoretic semantics, natural language was an anathema, impossibly vague and incoherent." Upon closer inspection, however, the situation is not quite so dire. Indeed, Barwise and Cooper (1981) go on to say that: "To us, the revolutionary idea [...] is the claim that natural language is not impossibly incoherent [...] , but that large portions of its semantics can be treated by combining known tools from logic, tools like functions of finite type, the λ-calculus, generalized quantifiers, tense and modal logic, and all the rest." In this article, we subscribe to this more optimistic view on natural language. While it is certainly possible to create vague, ambiguous or meaningless natural language statements, we believe that a careful use of suitable parts of natural language can avoid such problems. Indeed, much of science and mathematics throughout the centuries has been developed by means of a clear and precise use of natural language. It is this same clarity and precision that we want to achieve in our study of informal semantics.
The main goal of this paper is to study the informal semantics of answer set programming (ASP) -a broadly used logic-based knowledge representation formalism (Marek and Truszczynski, 1999; Niemelä, 1999; Brewka et al., 2011; Gebser et al., 2012) . ASP has its roots in extended logic programming (ELP) proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988; . As part of the development of ELP, Gelfond and Lifschitz presented an informal semantics GL I for extended logic programs based on epistemic notions of default and autoepistemic reasoning. According to their proposal, an extended logic program expresses the knowledge of a rational introspective agent, where a stable model (or an answer set) represents a possible state of belief of the agent by enumerating all literals that are believed in that state. The Gelfond-Lifschitz informal semantics is attuned to applications in epistemic domains. However, it is not well aligned with others.
A decade after ELP was conceived, researchers realized that, in addition to modeling applications requiring autoepistemic reasoning, the language can be used for modeling and solving combinatorial search and optimization problems (Marek and Truszczynski, 1999; Niemelä, 1999) . The term answer set programming was proposed shortly thereafter by Lifschitz (1999; to be synonymous with the practice of using extended logic programs for this type of applications. Since then, ASP has gained much attention and evolved into a computational knowledge repre-sentation paradigm capable of solving search problems of practical significance (Brewka et al., 2011) . Particularly influential was the emergence of a methodology to streamline the task of programming in this paradigm. It consists of arranging program rules in three groups: one to generate the search space, one to define auxiliary concepts, and one to test (impose) constraints. Lifschitz (2002) coined the term generate-define-test (GDT) to describe it. Programs obtained by following the GDT methodology, or GDT programs, for short, form the overwhelming majority of programs arising in search and optimization applications.
However, for GDT programs, the epistemic informal semantics is inappropriate and ineffective in its role. To illustrate this point, consider the graph coloring problem. One of the conditions of the problem is the following informal proposition:
"each node has a color".
(1)
In the language of ELP of 1999, this condition can be expressed by the rule
The reading that the GL I informal semantics provides for rule (2) 
is: "for every x, Aux holds if the agent does not know Aux and x is a node and the agent does not know that x has a color."
There is an obvious mismatch between this sentence and the simple (objective, non-epistemic) proposition (1) that rule (2) intends to express. In other words, in this example, the explanatory power of the epistemic informal semantics diminishes. It fails to provide a direct, explicit link between the formal expression on the one side, and the property of objects in the domain of discourse it is intended to represent, on the other. Modern ASP dialects typically provide a more elegant notation for writing down constraints, such as:
However, in itself this does not address or fix the mismatch. Moreover, as we discuss further on in this paper, it is often surprisingly difficult to extend the Gelfond-Lifschitz epistemic informal semantics to cover the new language constructs of modern ASP dialects. At the root of the mismatch lies the reflective epistemic agent. A key aspect of the original applications for ELP was the presence of such an agent in the domain of discourse; typically it was a knowledge base that reflects on its own content. Such an agent is absent in the graph coloring problem and in typical problems that are currently solved using ASP. For example, there are no benchmarks in the series of ASP competitions (Gebser et al., 2007b; Denecker et al., 2009; Calimeri et al., 2011; Alviano et al., 2013a ) that mention or require an epistemic introspective agent.
In this paper, we present a new theory OB I of the informal semantics for ASP. We call it Tarskian because it interprets an answer set of an ASP program in the same way as a model of a first-order logic (FO) theory is interpreted-namely, as an abstraction of a possible state of affairs of the application domain, and not epistemically as a state of beliefs of an agent. We define this theory for the pragmatically important class of GDT programs and their subexpressions. Our informal semantics explains the formal semantics of ASP under the Tarskian view of answer sets. It offers an explanation of the meaning of connectives, including "non-classical" ones, and it satisfies Frege's compositionality principle. Under the new semantics, the mismatch between the information the user encapsulated in the program and the intended reading of the program disappears. For example, it maps the constraint (3) to the informal proposition (1). It is worth noting that the epistemic semantics GL I reflects the fact that ASP's roots are in the domain of commonsense reasoning. By contrast, the informal semantics that we introduce here uses the kind of natural language constructs common in mathematical texts.
A major issue in building an informal semantics for ASP concerns the structure of programs. Formally, programs are "flat" collections of rules. However, to a human expert, GDT programs have a rich internal structure. To build our informal semantics OB I , we develop an "intermediate" logic ASP-FO that is directly inspired by the GDT methodology, in which the (hidden) internal structure of GDT programs is made explicit. This structure supports the use of the compositionality principle when defining the informal semantics for the logic ASP-FO. We show that by exploiting splitting results for ASP (Ferraris et al., 2011) , programs constructed following the GDT methodology can be embedded in the logic ASP-FO. Thanks to the embedding, our discussion applies to the fragment of ASP consisting of GDT programs and establishes an informal semantics for this class of programs.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing theories of informal semantics for two logics: the one of first-order logic (Section 2), which provides guidance for our effort, and the Gelfond-Lifschitz theory of informal semantics for ELP (Section 3), with which we contrast our proposal. We then discuss the class of GDT programs, the focus of our work (Section 4), and present the logic ASP-FO as a way of making the internal structure of GDT programs explicit (Section 5). Section 6 then presents the main contribution of this paper: the informal semantics OB I . Section 7 presents a number of formal results in support of this information semantics. We finish with a discussion of related work (Section 8) and some conclusions (Section 9).
The formal and informal semantics of first-order logic
In this section, we introduce classical first order logic (FO), with special attention to its informal semantics. This serves two purposes. First, it is meant as an introduction of the interplay between formal and informal semantics. Much of that will be reused for the logic ASP-FO that we define later in this paper. Second, ASP-FO is a proper superset of FO. Hence, its formal and informal semantics will extend that of FO. Formal syntax of FO We assume an infinite supply of non-logical symbols: predicate and function symbols, each with a non-negative integer arity. Predicate and function symbols of arity 0 are called propositional and object symbols, respectively. A vocabulary Σ is a set of non-logical symbols.
A term t is an object symbol or a compound expression f (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where f is an n-ary function symbol and the t i 's are terms. An atom is an expression P (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where P is an n-ary predicate symbol and the t i 's are terms (in particular, propositional symbols are atoms). A formula is then inductively defined as follows:
• Each atom is a formula;
• If t 1 , t 2 are terms, then t 1 = t 2 is a formula;
• If ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are formulas, then so are ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 , ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 , ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 2 and ϕ 1 ⇔ ϕ 2 ;
• If ϕ is a formula, then so are ¬ϕ, ∃x ϕ and ∀x ϕ, where x is an object symbol, here called a variable.
An occurrence of a symbol τ in a formula ϕ is bound if it is within a subformula of the form ∃τ ψ or ∀τ ψ. Otherwise, the occurrence is free. In FO, the only symbols that occur bound are object symbols. Given a vocabulary Σ, we call a formula ϕ a sentence over Σ if all symbols with free occurrences in ϕ belong to Σ. The set of sentences over Σ is denoted L Σ . A theory is a finite set of formulas. A theory over Σ is a finite set of sentences over Σ.
Example 1
The running application in this section is graph coloring. We choose the vocabulary Σ col that consists of unary predicates Node and Colour ; a binary predicate Edge; and a unary function ColourOf intended to be the mapping from nodes to colors. We define T col to be the following sentence over Σ col :
Formal semantics of FO The basic semantic objects of FO are structures for a given vocabulary.
Definition 1
Let Σ be a vocabulary. A Σ-structure A consists of (i) a non-empty set dom(A), called the domain of A, and (ii) an interpretation function (·)
A that assigns an appropriate value τ A to each symbol τ of Σ:
• The value τ A of an n-ary function symbol τ is an n-ary total function over dom(A).
• The value τ
A of an n-ary predicate symbol τ is an n-ary relation over dom(A).
1
We call τ A the interpretation or value of τ in A. Given a Σ-structure A, we denote its vocabulary Σ by Σ A . We say that A interprets a vocabulary
For a given vocabulary Σ, we denote by S Σ the class of all Σ-structures. For a Σ-structure A, we define the projection of A on Σ ′ ⊆ Σ, written A| Σ ′ , to be the Σ ′ -structure with the same domain as A and the interpretation function (·)
Example 2
For the vocabulary Σ col , consider, for instance, the structure A col defined as follows:
Note that, in FO, a structure must interpret each function symbol by a total function on its domain. Therefore, while we intend ColourOf to be a function that maps nodes to colors, it must also map each of the colors to some value. This could be avoided by, for instance, allowing partial functions, or by using a typed variant of FO. For simplicity, however, we stay with classical definitions of FO. For a structure A, a 0-ary function symbol τ and a corresponding value v ∈ dom(A), we denote by A[τ : v] the structure identical to A except that τ
Definition 2
We extend the interpretation function (·) A of structure A to all compound terms over Σ A by the inductive rule -
We further extend this function to tuplest of terms over Σ A by defining
The value/interpretation t A is a well-defined object in the domain of A provided t is a term and A interprets all function and object symbols in t.
Next, we define the truth relation, or the satisfaction relation, between structures and formulas.
Definition 3 (Satisfaction relation A |= ϕ)
Let ϕ be an FO formula and A a structure interpreting all free symbols of ϕ. We define A |= ϕ by induction on the structure of ϕ:
-A |= P (t), where P is a predicate symbol, ift
When A |= ϕ, we say that ϕ is true in A, or that A satisfies ϕ, or that A is a model of ϕ.
The satisfaction relation is easily extended from formulas to theories.
Definition 4
Let T be an FO theory over Σ.
The satisfaction relation induces definitions of several other fundamental semantic concepts.
Definition 5 (Derived semantic relations)
A theory (or formula) T entails a formula ϕ, denoted T |= ϕ, if ϕ is satisfied in every structure A that interprets all symbols with free occurrences in T and ϕ, and satisfies T . A formula ϕ is valid (denoted |= ϕ) if it is satisfied in every structure that interprets its free symbols. A formula or theory is satisfiable if it is satisfied in at least one structure. A formula ϕ 1 is logically equivalent to ϕ 2 (denoted ϕ 1 ≡ ϕ 2 ) if for every structure A that interprets the free symbols of both formulas, A |= ϕ 1 if and only if A |= ϕ 2 .
The informal semantics of FO The theory of informal semantics of FO is a coherent system of interpretations of its formal syntax and semantics that explains formulas as objective propositions about the application domain, structures as "states of affairs" of the application domain, and the satisfaction relation as a truth relation between states of affairs and propositions. It also induces informal semantics for the derived semantical relations. We will denote this informal semantics by FO, and the three components of which it consists (i.e., the interpretation of formulas, the interpretation of structures, and the interpretation of semantic relations such as satisfaction) by FO L , FO S and FO |= , respectively.
The informal semantics of a formula ϕ is the information that is represented by ϕ about the problem domain. It is essentially a thought. Following the quote by Frege at the beginning of this article, we make these thoughts tangible by giving them a linguistic form. In other words, the first component of the theory of informal semantics of FO consists of a mapping of FO formulas to natural language statements.
The informal semantics of a formula ϕ depends on a parameter -the meaning that we give to the symbols of vocabulary Σ of ϕ in the application domain. This is captured by the intended interpretation I of the vocabulary Σ. To state the informal semantics of a formula over Σ in linguistic form, we specify I as an assignment of natural language expressions to the symbols of Σ. For an n-ary function f /n, I(f /n) (or I(f ), if the arity is clear or immaterial) is a parameterized noun phrase that specifies the value of the function in the application domain in terms of its n arguments. Similarly, for an n-ary predicate p/n, I(p/n) is a parametrized sentence describing the relation between n arguments of p. In either case, the ith argument is denoted as # i .
Example 3
In the running example, the intended interpretation I col of the vocabulary Σ col can be expressed in linguistic form as parameterized declarative sentence and parameterized noun phrases:
• I col (Node/1) ="# 1 is a node"; • I col (Edge/2) ="there is an edge from # 1 to # 2 "; • I col (ColourOf /1) ="the color of # 1 "; Given an intended interpretation I for a vocabulary Σ, the informal semantics FO L I of FO terms and formulas over Σ is now the inductively defined mapping from formal expressions to natural language expressions specified in Table 1. A special case in Table 1 is its final row. It gives the meaning of the implicit composition operator of FO, i.e., the operator that forms a single theory out of a number of sentences. The informal semantics of this operator is simply that of the standard (monotone) conjunction.
Example 4
For the theory T col defined in Example 1, FO L I col (T col ) results in the following statement:
For all x in the universe of discourse, for all y in the universe of discourse, if there is an edge from x to y, then it is not the case that the color of x and the color of y are the same.
In other words, T col states that adjacent nodes are of different color. 
the noun phrase I(f ) with its parameters instantiated to FO
L I (t1), . . . , FO L I (tn)) P (t1, . . . , tn) I(P ) FO L I (t1), . . . , FO L I (tn) (i.e.,
the declarative sentence I(P ) with its parameters instantiated to FO
there exists an x in the universe of discourse such that FO 
Example 5
Let us consider an alternative application domain for the FO language considered above, in which we have humans, each of some age, and each possiby with some siblings. We now may have the following intended interpretation I sib of the vocabulary Σ col :
• I sib (N ode/1) ="# 1 is a human";
• I sib (Edge/2) ="# 1 and # 2 are siblings";
• I sib (ColorOf /1) ="the age of # 1 ".
For all x in the universe of discourse, for all y in the universe of discourse, if x and y are siblings, then it is not the case that the age of x and the age of y are the same.
In other words, in the "sibling" application domain, the theory T col states that siblings have different age.
Informal semantics for FO's semantical concepts In addition to explaining the informal meaning of syntactical expressions, the informal semantics of FO also offers explanations of FO's formal semantical objects: structures, the satisfaction relation, and the derived concepts of entailment, satisfiability, and validity.
The basic informal notion behind these concepts is that of a state of affairs. States of affairs differ in the objects that exists in the universe of discourse, or in the relationships and functions amongst these objects. The application domain is in one of many potential states of affairs. In a state of affairs, a proposition of the application domain is either true or false.
The intended interpretation I in general does not fix the state of affairs. Rather, it determines an abstraction function from states of affairs to Σ-structures.
2
Example 6
Under the intended interpretation I col for the vocabulary Σ col , the Σ col -structure A col of Example 2 represents any state of affairs with five elements in the universe of discourse: three nodes abstracted as n 1 , n 2 , n 3 with edges corresponding to (n 1 , n 2 ) and (n 2 , n 3 ) and two colors represented by c 1 , c 2 ; finally, a coloring mapping that associates colors to all elements (nodes and colors).
In the sequel, we denote the class of states of affairs that abstract under I to structure A as FO S I (A). We call this the informal semantics of the structure A under I. Table 2 expresses the meaning of structures as explained above.
Different intended interpretations I give rise to different abstractions.
Example 7
Under the alternative intended interpretation I sib of Example 5, A col represents any state of affairs with three persons and two ages, where the sibling relation consists of pairs corresponding to (n 1 , n 2 ) and (n 2 , n 3 ) and where persons n 1 , n 3 have the same age different from that of n 2 . However, no possible state of affairs under this intended interpretation abstracts into A col , since the sibling relation amongst a group of persons is always an equivalence relation while Edge The informal semantics of the satisfaction relation |= between structures and sentences is the relation between states of affairs and true propositions in it. That is, A |= ϕ is interpreted as "(the proposition represented by) ϕ is true in the state of affairs (corresponding to) A." Table 3 summarizes this observation.
We thus specified for each vocabulary Σ and for every intended interpretation I for Σ a triple FO I = (FO Informal semantics of derived semantical relations The standard theory of informal semantics of FO also induces the informal meaning for the derived semantical concepts of entailment, equivalence, validity, satisfiability, and equivalence in a way that reflects our understanding of these concepts in mathematics and formal science. For instance, under the standard informal semantics of FO, a formal expression ψ |= ϕ (entailment), becomes the statement that the informal semantics of ϕ (a statement that expresses a property of the application domain) is true in every state of affairs for that application domain, in which the informal semantics of ψ (another statement that expresses a property of the application domain) is true (which, in case the informal semantics of ψ and ϕ are mathematical propositions, means that the first proposition, the one corresponding to ψ, mathematically entails the second proposition, the one corresponding to ϕ). Similarly, validity of ϕ means that the informal semantics of ϕ is true in every state of affairs, and satisfiability of ϕ means that the informal semantics of ϕ is true in at least one state of affairs.
Precision of the informal semantics
The informal semantics FO L I (ϕ) of a sentence of theory T under intended interpretation I is a syntactically correct statement in natural language, but is this statement a sensible and precise statement about the application domain? This is a concern given the vagueness, ambiguity and the lack of coherence that is so often ascribed to natural language (Barwise and Cooper, 1981) . We now discuss this.
First, when the intended interpretation I of Σ is vague or ambiguous, then indeed, the informal semantics of FO sentences over Σ will be vague or ambiguous. E.g., if we interpret Edge I as "# 1 is rather similarly looking as # 2 ", then surely the informal semantics of sentences containing this predicate will be vague. FO is not designed to express information given in terms of vague concepts. In FO, as in many other languages, it is the user's responsibility to design a vocabulary with a clear and precise intended interpretation. A second potential source of ambiguity lies in the use of natural language connectives such as "and", "or", "if. . . then. . . ", etc. in Table 1 . Several of these connectives are overloaded, in the sense that they may mean different things in different contexts. However, this does not necessarily lead to ambiguity or vagueness, since human readers are skilled in using context to disambiguate overloaded concepts. Let us consider several potential ambiguities.
In natural language, the connective "and" corresponds not only to logical conjunction, but also to temporal consecutive conjunction exemplified in I woke up and brushed my teeth. However, the temporal interpretation arises only in a temporal context. Table 1 is not stated within a temporal context, so it is logical conjunction that is intended and this intended meaning is inherited in every occurrence of ∧ in every FO sentence. Similarly, the word "or" is used to denote both inclusive and exclusive disjunction. In mathematical texts its accepted meaning is that of inclusive disjunction. The rule for "or" in Table 1 explicitly adds "or both", to remove any possibility for ambiguity.
The conditional "if . . . then . . . " is famously ambiguous. It can mean many different things in varying contexts (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005) . Therefore, any choice for the formal and informal semantics of the implication symbol can only cover part of the use of the conditional in natural language 3 . In FO, the informal semantics of ⇒ was chosen to be the material implication, which interprets "if A then B" as "not A or B". It has the benefit of being simple and clear, and it is likely the conditional that we need and use most frequently in mathematical text. To summarize, the natural language connectives and quantifiers in Table 1 Informal semantics as the "empirical" component of logic Formal sentences of a knowledge representation logic are used to specify information about an application domain. The role of the informal semantics theory of a knowledge representation logic is to provide a principled account of which information about an application domain is expressed by formal sentences of the logic. In other formal empirical sciences, we find theories with a similar role. A physics theory (e.g., quantum mechanics) not only consists of mathematical equations but, equally important, also of a theory that describes, often with extreme precision, how the mathematical symbols used in these equations are linked to observable phenomena and measurable quantities in reality. This second part of the theory therefore plays a role similar to that of the informal semantics theory of a knowledge representation logic.
A physics theory is a precise, falsifiable hypothesis about the reality it models. Such a theory can never be proven. But it potentially can be experimentally falsified by computing a mathematical prediction from the formal theory, and verifying if the measured phenomena match the predictions. If not, the experiment refutes the theory. Otherwise, it corroborates (supports) the theory. Availability of a large and diverse body of corroborating experiments, in the absence of experimental refutation, increases our confidence in the theory.
Likewise, a formal logic with a theory of informal semantics is a precise, falsifiable hypothesis about the forms of information (the "thoughts") expressible in the logic and their truth in different states of affairs. A possible experiment here could consist of a choice of a vocabulary Σ with intended interpretation I, a Σ-theory T and a Σ-structure A. Alternative theories of informal semantics of FO That the informal and formal semantics correspond so well to each other is not an accident. The key to this is the tight correspondence between the natural language expressions occurring in Table 1 and the statements used in the bodies of rules of Definition 3, for instance, between the informal and formal semantics of ∨, where we have "FO
ψ) (or both)," on the one side, and the condition for A |= ψ ∨ϕ, "A |= ψ or A |= ϕ (or both)," on the other. Breaking this correspondence would lead to many mismatches between informal and formal semantics. E.g., suppose we modify the formal semantics:
A |= ψ ∨ ϕ if A |= ψ or (exclusively) A |= ϕ but we keep the entry for ∨ in Table 1 . That would obviously create a range of experiments in which formal and informal semantics are in mismatch. E.g., for the propositional vocabulary Σ = {P, Q}, it now holds that {P, Q} |= P ∨ Q while under any intended interpretation of P, Q, the statement "I I (P ) or I I (Q) (or both)" is true in the state of affairs FO S I ({P, Q}). However, while the formal semantics constrains the informal semantics, it does not uniquely determine it. The informal semantics of formulas arises from a coherent set of interpretations of language constructs and of the semantic primitives: structures and |=. By carefully changing this system, we may obtain an informal semantics that still matches with the formal semantics although it assigns a very different meaning to formulas. Let us illustrate this.
In the proposed new informal semantics, we reinterpret all connectives such that the informal semantics of any sentence is exactly the negation of its standard informal semantics, and we reinterpret A |= ϕ to mean that the informal semantics of ϕ is false in states of affairs represented by A. These two negations then compensate for each other, leading to a theory of informal semantics that still matches with the formal semantics, even though it assigns the negation of the standard informal semantics to each FO sentence! To be precise, the alternative informal semantics theory is given by (FO Table 4 . To illustrate, let us consider the formulaφ col :
The non-standard informal semanticsFO L I interprets the formulaφ col as:
For all x in the universe of discourse, for all y in the universe of discourse it is not the case that there is an edge from x to y, or the color of x and the color of y are not the same.
Stated differently,FO
L I says that adjacent nodes are of different color. Note that this statement is the negation of the standard informal semantics of this formula and that it has the same meaning as the one produced by the standard informal semantics FO
Since in the new informal semantics, structures are still interpreted in the same way as before, it follows thatFO
On the formal side, nothing has changed and it is the case that A col |=φ col , i.e., the formula is not formally satisfied in the structure. But under the new informal semantics, the relation |= is now interpreted as non-satisfaction and hence, A col |=φ col is to be interpreted as the fact thatFO
Which is true! Thus, even though the formal semantics of a logic strongly constrains its informal semantics, there may nevertheless remain different informal semantics that correspond to the logic's formal semantics. In the case of FO, an informal semantics such asFO L I is counterintuitive and of no practical use.
As many logics reuse the connectives of FO, we will use the following terminology. We will say that a connective is classical in a logic under some informal semantics I I if I L I interprets it in the same way as FO L I does (i.e., by the same natural language phrase). For instance, in the non-standard informal semanticsFO L I for FO, the negation connective ¬ is classical, whereas the conjunction connective ∧ is not.
In the rest of this paper, we often omit the superscript from the notation
|= I when it is clear which of the three components of a theory of informal semantics I I is intended.
The original formal and informal semantics of extended logic programs
In this section, we recall the standard formal and informal semantics of extended logic programs as it appeared in Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988, 1991) . An alternative review of the informal semantics for this logic can be found in (Gelfond and Kahl, 2014 , Section 2.2.1). For simplicity, here we only consider the propositional case. Logic programs with variables are interpreted by the means of their so-called grounding that transforms them into propositional programs.
A literal is either an atom A or an expression ¬A, where A is an atom. An extended logic programming rule is an expression of the form
where A, B i , and C j are propositional literals. If all the literals A, B i and C i are atoms (i.e., symbol ¬ does not appear in the rule), then such a rule is called normal. The literal A is the head of the rule and expression B 1 , . . . , B n , not C 1 , . . . , not C m is its body. We may abbreviate this rule as Head ← Body. An extended logic program is a finite set of such rules. We denote the set of all programs in a given vocabulary Σ by P Σ .
A consistent set of propositional literals is a set that does not contain both A and its complement ¬A for any atom A. A believed literal set X is a consistent set of propositional literals. We denote the set of all believed literal sets for a vocabulary Σ by B Σ . A believed literal set X satisfies a rule r of the form (4) if A belongs to X or there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that B i ∈ X or a j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that C j ∈ X. A believed literal set is a model of a program P if it satisfies all rules r ∈ P . Table 4 . A non-standard informal semantics of FO. The informal semantics of terms is as in Table 1 and the informal semantics of structures as in Table 2 .
it is not the case that
¬ϕ it is not the case thatFO
∃x ϕ for all x in the universe of discourse,FO
∀x ϕ there exists an x in the universe of discourse such thatFO
For a rule r of the form (4) and a believed literal set X, the reduct r X is defined whenever there is no literal C j for j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that C j ∈ X. If the reduct r X is defined, then it is the rule
The reduct P X of the program P consists of the rules r X for all r ∈ P , for which the reduct is defined. A believed literal set X is a stable model or answer set of P , denoted X |= st P , if it is a ⊆-least model of P X .
The formal logic of extended logic programs consists of the triple (P Σ , B Σ , |= st ). Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988; described an informal semantics for such programs based on epistemic notions of default and autoepistemic reasoning. Just as with FO I , the informal semantics GL I arises from a system of interpretations of the formal syntactical and semantical concepts. We now recall this informal semantics, which we name GL I . We denote its three components by GL One of the key aspects of GL I is that it views a believed literal set X as an abstraction of a belief state of some agent. An agent in some belief state considers certain states of affairs as possible and the others as impossible. The corresponding believed literal set X is the set of all literals L that the agent believes in, that is, those that are true in all states of affairs that agent regards as possible. Importantly, it is not the case that a literal L that does not belong to X is believed to be false by the agent. Rather, it is not believed by the agent: the literal is false in some states of affairs the agent holds possible, and it may be true in others. In fact, L is true in at least one of the agents possible state of affairs unless the complement of L belongs to X (unless the agent believes the complement of L). Thus, the informal semantics GL I explains the meaning of programs in terms of what literals an agent with incomplete knowledge of the application domain might believe in.
Example 9
Consider the believed literal set X = {student(mary), male(john)} under the obvious intended interpretation I for the propositional atoms. This X is the abstraction of any belief state in which the agent both believes that Mary is a student and that John is male, and does not believe that John is a student or that Mary is male. One such belief state is the state B 0 in which the agent considers the following states of affairs as possible:
1. John is the only male in the domain of discourse; Mary is the only student. 2. John and Mary are both male students. 3. John and Mary are both male; Mary is the only student. 4. John is the only male; John and Mary are both students Another belief state corresponding to X is the state B 1 in which the agent considers the states of affairs 2-4 of B 0 as possible. In both, Mary is a student and John a male in all possible states of affairs. John is student in worlds 2,4; Mary is male in worlds 2,3. Hence, literals ¬student(john) and ¬male(mary) are not believed.
Although both belief states abstract to the same believed literal set, they are different. When compared to B 0 , the belief state B 1 contains the additional belief that either John is a student or Mary is male. Since this additional belief is not atomic, a formal believed literal set cannot distinguish belief states in which it holds (e.g., B 1 ) from belief states in which it does not (e.g., B 0 ). In this way, different informal belief states are still abstracted to the same formal believed literal set. This shows that believed literal sets are a rather coarse way of abstracting belief states, compared to, e.g., believed formula sets or Kripke structures.
We denote the class of informal belief states that are abstracted to a given formal believed literal set X under an intended interpretation I as GL S I (X). Table 5 summarizes this abstraction function. Table 6 shows the Gelfond-Lifschitz informal semantics GL L I of programs. As in the informal semantics for FO, each atom A has an intended interpretation I(A) which is represented linguistically as a noun phrase about the application domain. The intended interpretation I(¬A) is "it is not the case that I(A)". As is clear from this table, under GL L I , extended logic programs have both classical and non-classical connectives. On the one hand, the comma operator is classical conjunction and the rule operator ← is classical implication. On the other hand, the implicit composition operator (constructing a program out of individual rules) is non-classical, because Table 6 . The Gelfond-Lifschitz (1988; informal semantics for ASP formulas.
propositional literal ¬A it is not the case that I(A) expression of the form not C the agent does not know that GL
All the agent knows is:
• GL L I (r1) and
it performs a closure operation: the agent knows only what is explicitly stated. Of the two negation operators, symbol ¬ is classical negation, whereas not is a non-classical negation, which is called default negation.
The final component of the GL theory of informal semantics is GL |=st I , which explains what it means for a set of literals X to be a stable model of a program P . As can be seen in Table 7 , this means that, given that GL L I (P ) represents precisely the knowledge of the agent, X could be the set of literals the agent believes. -Lifschitz (1988; informal semantics for the ASP satisfaction relation.
|=st GL |=st I
X |=st P Given that all the agent knows is GL L I (P ), X could be the set of literals the agent believes To illustrate this informal semantics, let us consider Gelfond and Lifschitz' well-known interview example.
Example 10
Whether students of a certain school are eligible for a scholarship depends on their GPA and on their minority status. The school has an incomplete database about candidate students. Students for which the school has insufficient information to decide eligibility should be invited for an interview. The following ELP program expresses the school's knowledge.
HighGP A(mary).
¬M inority(david). F airGP A(david).
The three rules for Eligible specify a partial policy for eligibility: they determine the eligibility for all students except for non-minority students with fair GPA. In this sense, under GL I , this program does not actually define when a student is eligible. The next rule is epistemic. It expresses that the school interviews a person whose eligibility is unknown. The remaining rules specify partial data on students Mary, Brit and David. In particular, F airGP A(brit) and even F airGP A(mary) are unknown.
For Mary, the first rule applies and the school knows that she is eligible. The epistemic fourth rule will therefore not conclude that she should be interviewed. Incidentally, nor is it implied that she will not be interviewed; the school (formally, the program) simply does not know. This follows from the informal semantics of the implicit composition operator: "all the agent knows is. . . ". For Brit and David, their eligibility is unknown. However, the reasons are different: for Brit because of lack of data, for David because the policy does not specify it. Therefore, both will be interviewed. The unique answer set extends the student data with the following literals:
The crucial property of this example is that whether a student should be interviewed does not only depend on properties of the student alone, but also on the agent's knowledge about this student. In other words, it is perfectly possible that the same student should be interviewed when applying to school A but not when applying to school B, even when the eligibility criteria used by the two schools are precisely the same. Indeed, this can happen if school B has more information on record about the student in question. Because of this property, a logic with a subjective informal semantics is required here.
It is illustrative to compare this example to, for instance, graph coloring. Whether a graph is colorable given a certain number of colors is purely a property of this graph itself. It does not depend on anyone's knowledge about this graph, and it does not depend on which agent is doing the coloring. In other words, graph coloring lacks the subjective, epistemic component of the interview example. Consequently, as we illustrated in Section 1, applying GL I to the rules of a typical GDT graph coloring program produces a misleading result. It refers to the knowledge of an agent, when in fact there exists no agent whose knowledge is relevant to the problem.
The interview example, with its inherent epistemic component, is a clear case where the informal semantics GL I applies. Similar informal semantics have also been developed for other formalisms for modeling reasoning with incomplete information, including default logic (Reiter, 1980) and autoepistemic logic (Moore, 1985) , and much of our discussion above extends to such formalisms, too. They all have a role to play but it is important to be aware of the scope of their applicability.
To the best of our knowledge, GL I is the only informal semantics developed in the literature for the language of extended logic programs. Answer set programming adopted it, when it adopted the language of extended logic programming. However, the informal semantics GL I is not suitable for typical answer set programing applications. Moreover, over time, answer set programming has developed a richer language with features not found in the original papers by Gelfond and Lifschitz, including choice rules, aggregates and weight constraints. If is often non-trivial to extend GL I to these richer languages, as illustrated in the next paragraph.
Extending GL I to modern ASP is difficult As a simple example of a modern ASP language feature, we consider the constraint (3) used to model the property that nodes should be colored. As stated in the introduction, GL I provides the following informal semantics for this rule: "for every x, Aux holds if the agent does not know Aux and x is a node and the agent does not know that x has a color."
Can a simpler informal semantics (that avoids the predicate Aux) be given for constraint (3) directly? This question is not easily answered. Starting from the way in which Table 6 interprets atoms and the operator not, one plausible candidate for such an informal semantics is the sentence: "for every x, it is not the case that x is a node and the agent does not know that x has a color '. However, upon closer analysis, this sentence turns out not to match with the formal semantics. This can be seen as follows. Let us suppose for simplicity that the Herbrand universe consists of only one constant a. The proposed informal semantics boils down then to: (*) "It is not the case that a is a node and the agent does not know that a has a color."
Consider now the ASP program P that consists only of the constraint (3). This program has a unique answer set ∅, the empty believed literal set. Let B be any (informal) belief state that satisfies (*). In order for our proposed sentence (*) to be a correct informal semantics for (3), this belief state B must abstract to the unique answer set ∅ of P . If so, then in B it is not known that a is colored (because Colored(a) ∈ ∅). It follows that B must satisfy the property "it is not the case that a is a node." In other words, B cannot consider as possible any state of affairs in which a is a node. Or, to put it in even simpler terms, the belief state B must contain the belief that a is not a node. However, since B abstracts to ∅, it must then be the case that ¬N ode(a) ∈ ∅, which is clearly false. Therefore, our proposed informal semantics of (3) is incorrect.
It is not the purpose of this article to present an epistemic informal semantics for modern ASP languages. We bring up this issue to point out that doing so is often more problematic than one might expect. This is not only the case for constraints, but also for choice rules, whose informal epistemic semantics has been the topic of lively debates in the ASP community 4 . For the sake of completeness, we conclude this discussion by mentioning that a correct informal epistemic reading of (3) is:
(**) "for every x, it is not the case that the agent knows that x is a node and the agent does not know that x has a color."
Writing constraints such as (3) is common practice among ASP programmers. At the same time, the fact that (*) is not a correct informal semantics for them while (**) is, appears to be far from common knowledge. This illustrates the pitfalls of using the Gelfond and Lifschitz' epistemic informal semantics with the GDT programming methodology.
Our goal in this paper is to develop an alternative informal semantics OB I for answer set programming, which, unlike GL I , is objective, that is, not epistemic, and extends to new features of the language that ASP now takes for granted. The rationale behind this effort is our conviction that such an objective informal semantics will be better aligned with typical GDT programs. Before we introduce it, we first review the GDT paradigm.
Generate-Define-Test methodology
The generate-define-test (GDT) methodology (Lifschitz, 2002) was proposed as a principled way to encode search problems in ASP. Over the years, it became the de facto standard in the field. The GDT methodology yields programs that consist of three parts: generate, define and test.
The role of generate is to generate the search space. In modern ASP languages this task is often accomplished by a set of choice rules:
where A, B i , and C j are atoms (possibly, non propositional). Intuitively, rule (5) states that the atom in the head can take any of the values true and false, if the condition expressed by the body of the rule holds. We call the predicate symbol of A generated. The define part is a set of definitions of input and auxiliary predicates. Each definition is encoded by a group of normal rules (i.e., rules of the form (4) in which the expressions A, B i and C j are all atoms). In such a rule, the predicate symbol of the head A is the one being defined. Input predicates are defined by exhaustive enumeration of their extensions. That is, their definitions consist of sets of facts, i.e., rules of form (4) that have empty bodies and contain no variables. For facts, the symbol ← is often omitted from the notation. Auxiliary predicates are defined by sets of rules (4) that specify these symbols by describing how to derive their extensions from the extensions of the generated and input symbols. Finally, the test part eliminates some generated candidate answer sets. It consists of constraint rules:
where B i and C j are atoms. Each constraint rule eliminates those candidate answer sets, in which all B i are true and all C j are false.
As such, the GDT methodology identifies different components of programs by assigning them a particular operational task (e.g., "generate search space", "test candidate solution") in the computation of answer sets. Thus, it is about the computation process of answer sets and not about the meaning of expressions in ASP programs. In other words, the GDT methodology does not specify an informal semantics for GDT programs.
We call finite sets of choice, normal, and constraint rules core ASP programs. For these core ASP programs, we will adopt the formal semantics proposed by Ferraris et al. (2011) . The main concepts of this semantics are briefly reviewed in the appendix; we omit the details, as they are not relevant for the purposes of this paper.
While syntactically simple, core ASP programs are expressive enough to support the GDT methodology. Moreover, they are a part of almost all ASP dialects, modulo minor syntactic differences. Thus, they form a convenient target language for our study of GDT programs. However, the GDT methodology is not restricted to core ASP. Many applications rely on extensions such as aggregates and weight expressions, or use different means to implement the generate task (pairs of rules P ← not P * , P * ← not P ; disjunctions P ∨ P * ; or rules P ← not not P ). The discussion we present here also applies to programs that contain such expressions. We touch on this subject in Section 8.
To illustrate the GDT methodology, we present a core ASP program that encodes the Hamiltonian cycle problem.
← Node(x), Node(y), not T (x, y).
The long horizontal lines indicate the partition of the program into the generate, define, and test parts respectively. The short lines inside the define part separate groups of rules defining individual predicates. Inside the test part, they separate individual constraints. Predicate symbol In is a generated symbol, symbols Node and Edge are input symbols, and T is an auxiliary one. The generate part specifies all subsets In of the Edge relation as candidate solutions. The relations Node and Edge represent all vertices and edges of the input graph and are defined by enumeration. The relation T represents the auxiliary concept of the transitive closure of the relation In. The test part "weeds out" those candidate answer sets, whose In relation does not correspond to a Hamiltonian cycle. The auxiliary relation T is necessary to state the constraint that a Hamiltonian cycle connects every pair of vertices.
As this example illustrates, a GDT program often has a rich internal structure. For instance, in the example above
• rules can be partitioned into three groups generate, define and test • define contains separate definitions for three predicates Node, Edge and T , and • test consists of three independent constraints.
The fact that the internal structure of programs remains implicit in the standard ASP formalism motivates us to introduce the ASP-FO language in the next section that makes the structure of programs explicit. In ASP-FO, rules in generate, define and test can be further split out in independent modules called G-modules, D-modules and T-modules.
The logic ASP-FO
We now turn to our goal of developing an informal semantics for GDT programs. To this end, motivated by the GDT methodology, we propose a logic ASP-FO and develop for it an informal semantics. We design the logic ASP-FO so that each core ASP program can be cast as an ASP-FO program without any essential changes. In this way, the informal semantics for ASP-FO can be used for ASP programs and, as we argue, becomes particularly effective in explaning the meaning of GDT programs.
Syntax
As in FO, expressions of ASP-FO are built from predicate and function symbols of some vocabulary Σ. Theories of ASP-FO consist of three types of modules: G-modules, D-modules and T-modules.
A choice rule is an expression of the form:
where ϕ is an FO formula, P (t) is an atom, andx includes all free variables appearing in the rule. We call the expression {P (t)} the head of the rule and refer to P as its head predicate. We call ϕ the body of the rule.
Definition 6 (G-module)
A G-module is a finite set of choice rules with the same head predicate. Moreover, the head predicate may not appear in the body of the rules.
While many modern ASP solvers allow recursive choice rules, our concept of G-modules is more restrictive. This is in keeping with our view of G-modules as modules that generate the search space from a given problem instance. To generate such a search space, recursion does not seem to be required.
Recursion is allowed and, in fact, necessary in the define part. A define rule is an expression of the form
where ϕ is an FO formula, P (t) is an atom, andx includes all free variables appearing in the rule. The concepts of the head, the head predicate and the body of the rule are defined in an obvious way similarly as above. 
Definition 8 (T-module)
A T-module is an FO sentence.
While G-modules and D-modules are sets of expressions, a T-module is not. Since any finite set of FO sentences ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n can be equivalently represented by its conjunction ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n , the restriction of T-modules to single formulas does not result in any loss of generality.
Definition 9
An ASP-FO theory is a finite set of G-modules, D-modules, and T-modules.
We say that an ASP-FO module or theory Ψ is over vocabulary Σ if every non-logical symbol mentioned in Ψ belongs to Σ. In case of a D-module Def, Π , also symbols in Def should belong to Σ.
We say that a predicate is specified by a G-module or D-module if it is the head predicate of the G-module or a defined predicate of the D-module. Unless stated differently, we assume that no predicate is specified by more than one module in an ASP-FO theory as this suffices to express GDT programs. However, the formal definitions of syntax and semantics of ASP-FO do not require this limitation.
From Core ASP to ASP-FO Informally
There is an obvious match between language constructs of ASP-FO and those used in ASP to express generate, define and test. Specifically, an ASP choice rule (5) corresponds to an ASP-FO choice rule
a normal rule (4) corresponds to an ASP-FO define rule
and an ASP constraint (6) corresponds to the T-module given by the FO sentence
where in each case,x is the set of variables occurring in the ASP expression (5), (4) and (6), respectively. These syntactical translations turn both the constraint operator ← and the negationas-failure symbol not in (6) into the negation symbol ¬.
Consider the encoding (7) of the Hamiltonian cycle problem. It can be embedded in ASP-FO in several ways, including the following encoding that makes explicit the hidden structure of that program:
Merging the three D-modules into one would yield another embedding, with less internal structure.
Any answer set program written in the base formalism of Section 4 has a straightforward syntactic translation to an ASP-FO theory: choice rules are grouped according to their head predicate; normal rules are grouped together in one D-module, and each constraint can be represented as a single T-module (in each case, after rewritings described above). In the case of a D-module we can often reveal its hidden structure by splitting it into several smaller D-modules (as we did in the theory (10)). Section 5.5 provides a detailed formal account on the relation between answer set programs and ASP-FO theories.
Semantics
We now introduce the formal semantics of ASP-FO. As in FO and in a growing number of ASP semantics, the semantics is based on the standard notion of Σ-structures instead of literal sets. Using the terminology of logic programming and ASP, we call Σ-structures also Σ-interpretations.
A crucial feature of the semantics of ASP-FO is modularity: a structure/interpretation is a model of an ASP-FO theory T if it is a model of each of its modules. In other words, an ASP-FO theory can be understood as a standard monotone conjunction of its modules.
Definition 10 An interpretation A satisfies (is a model of) an ASP-FO theory T , written A |= T , if A satisfies (is a model of) each module in T .
To complete the definition of the semantics of ASP-FO theories, we now define the semantics of individual modules.
T-modules The case of T-modules is straightforward. T-modules are FO sentences and we use the classical definition of satisfaction (cf. Definition 3) to specify when a T-module holds in a structure.
G-modules The role of choice rules in GDT programs is to "open up" some atoms P (t) -to allow them to take any of the values true and false. We take this idea as the basis of our formalization of the semantics of G-modules.
Definition 11
An interpretation M is a model of a G-module G with head predicate P if for each tupled of elements in the domain of M such that M[x :d] |= P (x), there is a choice rule ∀ȳ ({P (t)} ← ϕ) in G and a tupled
D-modules We define the semantics of D-modules by adapting the stable semantics of definitions introduced by Pelov et al. (2007) . That semantics is based on the three-valued immediate consequence operator. It is obtained as a special case from the approximation fixpoint theory , which defines stable and well-founded fixpoints for arbitrary lattice operators. The semantics proposed by Pelov et al. (2007) is a generalization of the original GelfondLifschitz formal semantics. In particular, unlike the original semantics it is not restricted to Herbrand interpretations only. Our presentation follows that proposed by Vennekens et al. (2007) and developed further by Denecker et al. (2012) .
Definition 12 (Satisfaction by pairs of interpretations)
Let ϕ be an FO formula, A and B interpretations of all free symbols in ϕ (including free variables) such that A and B have the same domain and assign the same values to all function symbols. We define the relation (A, B) |= ϕ by induction on the structure of ϕ (for simplicity, we consider only the connectives ¬ and ∨, and the existential quantifier ∃):
When ϕ is a sentence, we define ϕ (A,B) = t if (A, B) |= ϕ and ϕ (A,B) = f otherwise. This is the standard satisfaction relation, except that positive occurrences of atoms are interpreted in A, and negative occurrences in B. When A = B, this relation collapses to the standard satisfaction relation of FO so that if ϕ is a sentence then
′ ) (and so, in particular, ϕ (·,·) is monotone in its first and antimonotone in its second argument). These two properties imply that the satisfiability relation in Definition 12 can be used to approximate the standard truth value, in the sense that if
Essentially, this satisfaction relation represents Kleene's and Belnap's three-and four-valued truth assignment functions (Feferman, 1984) . The connection is based on the bilattice correspondence between the four truth values f, t, u, i and pairs of lower and upper estimates (f, f), (t, t), (f, t), and (t, f), respectively. In this view, three-and four-valued interpretationsÃ correspond to pairs of interpretations (A l , A u ) sharing the domain and the interpretations of function symbols, and the truth value ϕÃ ∈ {f, t, u, i} corresponds to the pair (ϕ (A l ,Au) , ϕ (Au,A l ) ).
Definition 13
A pair of interpretations (A, B) sharing the domain and the interpretations of function symbols satisfies a define rule ∀x (P (t) ← ϕ) if for each tupled of domain elements, if
In the context of Herbrand interpretations, the two definitions reflect the way Gelfond and Lifschitz used the reduct to define stable models of normal logic programs. Let us recall that an extended logic program is normal if it consists of normal program rules only, and let us consider a D-module that corresponds to a normal program Π. Let M be an Herbrand interpretation. This parameterized stable-model semantics of D-modules extends the original stable-model semantics of normal logic programs in three ways: 1. it is parameterized, that is, it builds stable models on top of a given interpretation of the parameter symbols; 2. it handles FO bodies; and 3. it works for arbitrary (also non-Herbrand) interpretations. We stress that we use the term model here to distinguish the present concept from the stable model relative to an interpretation (Definition 14).
Example 11
Let us consider a D-module:
There are no function symbols here, r is the only parameter of D, and p and q are the defined symbols. Each interpretation A p of the parameter r determines the corresponding set of stable models relative to A p . Each such stable model is an interpretation of the defined symbols p and q. Let us investigate how these stable models are to be obtained. The class of candidates for a stable model relative to a given A p consists of interpretations M of the defined symbols p, q that have the same domain as A p . For each such M, A p • M is an interpretation of all symbols occurring in Π, that matches A p on the parameters and M on the defined symbols. Let us fix one such M and consider the set of all interpretations A such that (A p • A, A p • M) satisfies this rule set. In the evaluation of the first rule, q occurs negatively and so, it is evaluated with respect to A p • M. Moreover, since q is a defined predicate, it is evaluated in M. For the second rule, the parameter r is evaluated in A p . Thus, the set of all interpretations
According to the definition, M is a stable model of D relative to A p if it is the smallest interpretation of p and q to satisfy this condition. This is the case precisely if neither of these two set inclusions is strict, that is, if
This shows that each interpretation A p of r determines a unique stable model of D.
Applying Definition 15 to this example, we see that an interpretation A of the vocabulary Σ = {r, p, q} is a model of the D-module D if M = A| {p,q} satisfies the equations on p and q obtained from the equations for p M and q M by substituting M| {r} for A p .
The language design of ASP-FO was guided by our aim to develop an informal semantics for the most basic expressions and connectives of ASP. It is straightforward to extend the language ASP-FO with additional types of modules and language expressions. Section 5.4 introduces one new module called an Herbrand module. In Section 8 we discuss other possible extensions with aggregates, weight expressions and disjunction in the head.
Herbrand Modules
In applications where the domain of all relevant objects is known, it is common to design a vocabulary Σ such that each domain element is denoted by exactly one ground term. In such a case, considering Herbrand interpretations is sufficient. ASP is tailored to such applications. Consequently, it typically restricts its semantics to Herbrand interpretations only. The logic ASP-FO is an open domain logic with uninterpreted function symbols. We now introduce an Herbrand module into the language of ASP-FO. Its role is to express the proposition that the domain of discourse is the Herbrand universe. It allows us to restrict the semantics of ASP-FO to Herbrand interpretations and will facilitate the formal embedding of (standard) ASP into ASP-FO.
Definition 16
An Herbrand module over a set σ of function symbols is the expression H(σ). We say that M is a model of H(σ), denoted M |= H(σ), if dom(M) is the set of terms that can be built from σ, and if for each such term t, t M = t.
If Σ F is the set of all function symbols of Σ, then the models of the Herbrand module H(Σ F ) are precisely the Herbrand interpretations of Σ.
We now extend the definition of an ASP-FO theory as follows: an ASP-FO theory is a finite set of G-modules, D-modules, T-modules, and Herbrand modules.
An Herbrand module H(σ) in ASP-FO can be seen as a shorthand for the combination of the domain closure axiom DCA(σ) and the FO unique name axioms UNA(σ). A combination DCA(σ) and UNA(σ) can also be expressed in ASP-FO by means of D-and T-modules. 
  
that has one such rule as above for every function symbol f j /n in σ. In the case of a constant symbol C, the rule reduces to U (C) ← ⊤. This D-module defines U as the set of all ground terms of σ. The following T-module is added to express that there are no other objects in the domain:
Combining the above D-module and T-module with FO axioms UNA(σ) yields an ASP-FO theory whose models are (isomorphic to) the structures satisfying H(σ). Thus Herbrand modules are redundant in ASP-FO and serve only as useful and intuitive abbreviations.
Formal Relation to ASP
We now show that ASP-FO is a conservative extension of the core ASP language so that we can formally relate core ASP programs and ASP-FO theories. For a core ASP program Π, by Π we denote the collection of rules obtained by rewriting the rules in Π in the syntax of ASP-FO as illustrated in Section 5.2. Further, for a vocabulary Σ we write Σ P and Σ F for the sets of predicate and function symbols in Σ, respectively. What we are looking for is a connection between an ASP program and an ASP-FO theory that in the case of GDT programs makes their implicit structure explicit. To establish such a connection, we use the results by Ferraris et al. (2009) on "splitting". Splitting is a common method for uncovering the structure of programs for their further analyses. For instance, Erdogan and Lifschitz (2004) use it to prove correctness of GDT programs.
Let Π be a core ASP program of the syntactic form considered in Section 4 with rules of the form (5), (4) and (6). We define the positive predicate dependency graph of Π as the directed graph that has all predicates of Π as its vertices and that has an edge from a predicate P to a predicate Q whenever P appears in the head of a rule that has a non-negated Q in its body. We say that P positively depends on Q if there is a non-zero length path from P to Q in this graph.
Definition 17
− each Π i that contains a constraint is a singleton; − for each predicate P , all rules with P in the head belong to the same Π i ; and − if two predicates positively depend on each other, their rules belong to the same module Π i .
Splitting tends to decompose a program in components that can be understood independently. For instance, the horizontal lines in the Hamiltonian cycle program (7) identify a splitting in which each component has a simple and natural understanding.
Definition 18
A splitting {Π 1 , . . . , Π n } of Π is proper if no module Π i contains choice rules for two different predicates, or both a normal rule and a choice rule. In addition, no head predicate of a choice module may positively depend on itself.
The following proposition is straightforward. We use here a simplified notation, where Π denotes the D-module hd ( Π), Π .
Proposition 2
If Π has a proper splitting {Π 1 , . . . , Π n } then { Π 1 , . . . , Π n } is a well-formed ASP-FO theory.
For instance, the splitting of the Hamiltonian cycle program (7) identified by the horizontal lines is a proper splitting, and its translation is the ASP-FO theory (10).
Typically, a program Π with a proper splitting {Π 1 , . . . , Π n } is equivalent to the corresponding ASP-FO theory augmented with the Herbrand module. However, this is not the case for programs that contain predicates which do not appear in the head of any rule. In core ASP, such predicates are universally false. To obtain the same effect in ASP-FO, we add an additional "empty" Dmodule (Def , {}), where Def is the set of these predicates.
Theorem 3
Let Π be a core ASP program over a finite vocabulary Σ with a proper splitting {Π 1 , . . . , Π n }. Then an interpretation M is an answer set of Π if and only if M is a model of the ASP-FO theory {H(Σ F ), Π 1 , . . . , Π n , (Def , {})}, where Def = Σ P \ hd (Π).
This theorem essentially follows from the splitting result of Ferraris et al. (2011) . We present an argument in the appendix, as it requires technical notation and concepts not related to the main topic of the paper.
Theorem 3 implies that answer sets of the GDT program (7) coincide with Herbrand models of the ASP-FO theory (10). More generally, Theorem 3 states that properly splittable ASP programs can be embedded in ASP-FO while preserving their implicit internal structure. It therefore implies that such a program can be understood as the monotone conjunction of the ASP-FO modules of which it consists. Thus, even though ASP is a nonmonotonic logic, its nonmonotonicity is restricted to individual ASP-FO modules of which it consists. In this way, the theorem paves the way towards an informal semantics of GDT programs by reducing the problem to finding the informal semantics of their generate, define and test modules.
Informal semantics of ASP-FO
In this section, we develop the theory of informal semantics OB I for ASP-FO. We use the Hamiltonian cycle ASP-FO theory (10) as a test case. Through the model-preserving embedding of Theorem 3, this informal semantics applies to the original GDT program (7).
The Hamiltonian cycle theory expresses that a graph In is a Hamiltonian cycle of graph Edge: a linear cyclic subgraph of Edge that includes all vertices. The intended interpretation I of the predicate symbols of this theory can be specified as follows:
• I(Node): "# 1 is a vertex" • I(Edge): "there is an edge from # 1 to # 2 in graph Edge" • I(In): "there is an edge from # 1 to # 2 in graph In" and • I(T ): "# 2 is reachable from # 1 in graph In".
In addition to the above predicate symbols, the vocabulary of this theory also contains a number of constant symbols v, w, . . .. These are intended to represent the nodes of the graph. We therefore also add the Herbrand module H(Σ F ) to the theory.
The composition operator of ASP-FO theories
Formally, a structure A is a model of an ASP-FO theory if it is a model of each of its modules. In our Tarskian perspective, this means that a world is possible according to a theory if it is possible according to each of its modules. Thus, as for FO, the composition operator that describes how the meaning of a theory depends on the meaning of its elements is simply the standard conjunction: if an ASP-FO theory T consists of modules
. Therefore, adding a new module to an ASP-FO theory is a monotone operation, in the same way that adding an additional formula to an FO theory is.
Theorem 3 shows that a GDT program (to be precise, a core ASP program with a proper splitting) can be viewed as a monotone conjunction of its components. Thus, the nonmonotonicity of an ASP program in the GDT style is confined to individual components. Indeed, we will see that the informal composition operators that construct G-modules and D-modules from individual rules are not monotone. That is, the meaning of G-modules and D-modules cannot be understood as a simple conjunction of the meanings of their rules.
Informal semantics of T-modules (FO sentences)
Formally, a T-module T consists of FO sentences under their classical semantics. Therefore, we set OB I (T ) = FO I (T ). In the case of theory (10), this yields the following readings for its T-modules. The T-module
states that for all x, for all y and for all z, it is not the case that there are edges from x to y and from x to z in graph In and that y and z are not the same. This can be restated as: each domain element is the start of at most one edge in the graph In.
The T-module
has a similar reading, which can be equivalently stated as: each domain element is the end of most one edge in the graph In. The T-module
says that for every x and for every y, it is not the case that x and y are nodes, and y is not reachable from x in graph In. This can be equivalently stated as: every node is reachable from every other node in graph In. The three propositions above are precisely the properties that the graph In should satisfy to be a Hamiltonian cycle of the graph Edge. They therefore represent precisely what the ASP programmer intended to encode.
Informal semantics of G-modules (choice rules)
Choice rules in ASP are often explained in a computational way, as "generators of the search space." In this section, we develop a declarative interpretation for choice rules in ASP-FO.
We start by rewriting G-modules using a process similar to predicate completion (Clark, 1978) . First, every choice rule (8) in a G-module is rewritten as
Second, all resulting choice rules, say,
are combined into a single one:
We denote the result of this rewriting of a G-module G to a singleton G-module by S(G). It is evident that the rewriting preserves models.
Theorem 4 Every G-module G is equivalent to the singleton G-module S(G).
This result is important because singleton G-modules have a simple representation as FO sentences.
Theorem 5
An interpretation M satisfies a singleton G-module {∀x ({P (x)} ← ϕ)} if and only if M satisfies FO sentence ∀x (P (x) ⇒ ϕ).
Proof. By Definition 11, M satisfies {∀x ({P (x)} ← ϕ)} if and only if for each variable assignment θ such that M, θ |= P (x) it holds that M, θ |= ϕ. This is precisely the condition for M to satisfy ∀x (P (x) ⇒ ϕ). QED For instance, the singleton G-module {∀x∀y({In(x, y)} ← Edge(x, y))} of the ASP-FO theory (10) corresponds to the FO sentence ∀x∀y(In(x, y) ⇒ Edge(x, y)).
We call the result of first rewriting a G-module G to a singleton G-module and then translating the latter to FO the completion of G. We denote it by Gcompl(G). The following consequence of Theorem 4 provides the key property of Gcompl(G).
Corollary 6
Every G-module G is equivalent to the FO sentence Gcompl(G).
This corollary demonstrates that G-modules can be simulated by T-modules. It follows that ASP-FO theories can be seen as consisting of FO sentences and D-modules.
A G-module G for a predicate P is a set of choice rules
By Corollary 6, such G is equivalent to Gcompl(G):
Thus, given some intended interpretation I for a vocabulary Σ, and a G-module G over Σ of the form (13), the informal semantics OB I (G) must be equivalent to the informal semantics FO I (Gcompl(G)). With this in mind, we define OB I (G) by restating FO I (Gcompl(G)) as follows:
In general, for each x, P I [ x] is false. However, there are exceptions as expressed by the following rules:
, then it might be that FO I (P (tn)). − There are no other exceptions. This definition implicitly specifies the meaning of the logical connectives occurring in choice rule bodies, the rule operator ←, and the composition operator that forms a G-module out of its rules. We now make this meaning explicit.
First, in the translation of G-modules to FO sentences, choice rule bodies ϕ i are treated as "black boxes," that are simply copied and pasted into FO expressions. This shows that choice rule bodies in ASP-FO not only look like, but in fact are FO expressions, with all FO logical symbols retaining their informal semantics. In particular, this illustrates that the negation operator in the bodies of choice rules of an ASP-FO G-module is just classical negation.
Second, to explicate the informal semantics of the rule operator and the composition operator of G-modules, we note that the informal reading OB I (G) interprets a G-module as a local closed world assumption (LCWA) on predicate P (local refers to the scope of the assumption, which is restricted to P ), but provides an exception mechanism to relax it. Each rule of a G-module expresses an exception to the LCWA and reinstalls uncertainty, the open world assumption (OWA), on the head atom. For instance, the G-module {{In(x, y)} ← Edge(x, y)} states that "The Hamiltonian path (In) is empty except that if (x, y) is an edge of the graph G, then (x, y) might belong to it." We note that this yields an informal but precise linguistic reading of G and of rules in G, a reading that is indeed equivalent to the informal semantics of G's translation into FO which states that In is a subgraph of Edge.
It can be seen in OB I (G) that the rule operator in G-modules has unusual semantic properties. Each rule of a G-module is a conditional "if . . . then P (t) might be true". Its "conclusion" removes information (namely that P (t) is false) rather than adding some. This is unlike any other conditional or expression in logic that we are aware of.
Also the semantic properties of the composition operator of G-modules are unique. The composition operator underlying G-modules is neither conjunction nor disjunction. It is also not truth functional and not monotone. Adding a rule to a module corresponds to adding a disjunct to the corresponding FO sentence. Hence, the underlying composition operator is anti-monotone: the module becomes weaker with each rule added. This agrees with the role of a choice rule for expressing an exception to the LCWA on P . The more rules there are, the more exceptions and hence, the weaker the LCWA.
To recap, G-modules are given a precise informal semantics OB I (G) as a form of LCWA with an exception mechanism to relax it. Logical connectives in the bodies of choice rules retain their classical meaning. From a logical point of view, the rule operator and the composition operator of G-modules have uncommon semantical properties. Still, OB I (G) identifies a natural language conditional that explains formal choice rules in a declarative way. For example, when applied to the G-module of ASP-FO theory (10), it yields a correct reading of its G-module.
Informal semantics of D-modules
Humans use definitions to express abstractions of concepts they encounter. These abstractions are necessary for us to understand the world in which we live and function, and to the ability to relay this understanding to others. We communicate these definitions in natural language; already as children, we are trained to compose, understand, and use them effectively. Definitions also appear in the rigorous setting of scientific discourse. In fact, they are the main building blocks of formal science. In scientific and mathematical texts, definitions embody the most precise and objective forms of human knowledge. While definitions in a mathematical and scientific context are typically formulated with more precision than the definitions we use in everyday life, they are still informal, in the sense that they are not written in a formal language. We therefore refer to the unambiguous, precise natural language definitions of concepts we find in everyday life or in science and mathematics as informal definitions.
The stated goal of D-modules of an ASP-FO theory (and the define components of a GDT program) is to define concepts formally. We will now provide D-modules with an informal semantics matching precisely the formal one. The linguistic constructs used by humans to so effectively specify (informal) definitions are natural candidates for that task. We therefore start by reviewing some of these natural language expressions.
While there are no "official" linguistic rules on how to write an informal definition in a mathematical or scientific text, several conventions exist. Simple definitions often take the form of "if" or "if and only if"-statements. More complex cases are inductive (recursive) definitions, which are frequently represented as a set of informal rules, possibly with an induction order. A good example is Definition 3, where the satisfaction relation |= is defined over the subformula induction order. When written according to these linguistic conventions, a definition has a precise and objective meaning to us. Consider an intended interpretation I for a vocabulary Σ, a D-module D = Def , Π in this vocabulary, with Def = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, and
We define the relations P I 1 , . . . , P I n in terms of Par(D) I by the following (simultaneous) induction:
This last clause ("In no other cases ...") is usually left implicit if it is clear that we are giving a definition. The question that we address here is whether this is a suitable informal semantics for D-modules.
The above translation turns a D-module D into a natural language statement that follows the linguistic conventions used to express inductive definitions. If the D-module is not recursive, the phrase "by the following simultaneous induction" should be dropped; what remains then is a definition by exhaustive enumeration, in which each rule represents one case. This translation again makes use of the natural language connective "if". As before, however, when this word is encountered in the context of a case of an inductive definition, it has a precise and unambiguous meaning which is clear to any mathematician. We refer to this meaning as the "definitional implication". We later discuss how this conditional relates to material implication.
We now test the stated informal semantics on the three D-modules of the Hamiltonian cycle theory (10). The first two modules correspond to non-recursive definitions by exhaustive enumeration of elements in the extensions of the Node and Edge relations, respectively. The reading OB I (D) of the remaining D-module is as follows:
We define T in terms of the graph In by induction:
− for every x, for every y, y is reachable from x in the graph In if there is an edge from x to y graph in In − for every x, for every y, for every z, y is reachable from x in the graph In if z is reachable from x in the graph In and y is reachable from z in the graph In This is a standard monotone inductive definition of the transitive closure of graph In, which is the intended interpretation of T /2. Thus, we now have a proposal for a precise informal semantics OB I (·) for D-modules, and, through the embedding result of Theorem 3, therefore also for define components in GDT programs. The informal semantics we specified reflects the role of these define components in the GDT-methodology. The rest of the section is concerned with the following questions:
is a sensible informal definition, are the relations defined by this informal definition indeed the same relations as produced by the parametrized stable semantics of the D-module? (c) What is the meaning of the logical connectives in such D-modules and, through the embedding of GDT programs, in define components of GDT programs?
In the case of FO, and therefore also of T-modules and G-modules, the correspondence between the informal semantics FO I (ϕ) and the formal semantics of FO is made plausible by the great similarity between Table 1 and Definition 3. In the case of D-modules, however, the situation is more complex. The reason for this is that there is no obvious connection between the way (parametrized) stable models are defined and the way we understand informal inductive definitions.
To address the questions (a) -(c), we will borrow from the work on the logic FO(ID) Denecker and Ternovska, 2008) . The logic FO(ID) was conceived as a conservative extension of FO with a formal definition construct. Syntactically, FO(ID) corresponds to the fragment of ASP-FO without G-modules. A definition in the logic FO(ID) is a set of rules of exactly the same form as rules in D-modules. There is however a semantic difference: formal definitions in FO(ID) are interpreted under the two-valued parametrized well-founded semantics rather than the stable semantics. The three questions formulated above for D-modules of the logic ASP-FO arise also for FO(ID)'s definitions. They were investigated in detail by Denecker and Vennekens (2014) . The view taken in that study is that an informal inductive or recursive definition defines a set by specifying how to construct it: starting from the empty set, it proceeds by iterated rule application (possibly along some induction order) until the constructed set is saturated under rule application. Denecker We now observe that the logics FO(ID) and ASP-FO are tightly related, not only syntactically, but also semantically. As long as we restrict attention to D-modules that have two-valued wellfounded models, both logics are identical.
Theorem 7 (Pelov et al. (2007) The totality condition on D-modules (or FO(ID) definitions) addresses the question (a) as it serves as a general semantic criterion for a sensible definition. Broad classes of D-modules (FO(ID) definitions) are total in every context A. Others are total only in some contexts A. To provide some sense of scope, the classes of non-recursive, definite, stratified and locally stratified logic programs have straightforward generalizations as D-modules in ASP-FO (definitions in FO(ID)). Non-recursive, definite, and stratified normal programs give rise to D-modules that are total in every interpretation of the parameter symbols (Denecker and Ternovska, 2008) and can be thought of as formalizations of sensible definitions in every context A. Locally stratified normal programs give rise to definitions that are total in any Herbrand interpretation, and hence in the context of any theory that contains H(σ).
Informal semantics of connectives in D-modules in ASP-FO and FO(ID)
We now address question (c). Just as in the case of G-modules, the informal semantics OB I (D) of D-modules im-plicitly determines the informal semantics of the logical connectives occurring in D-module rule bodies and of the rule operator ←. Moreover, it also determines the semantical composition operator that "forms" the meaning of a D-module from its rules. The discussion below is restricted to D-modules D for which OB I (D) is a sensible inductive definition.
The translation OB I (D) treats a rule body ϕ by simply applying the standard informal semantics of FO to it. All logical symbols in rule bodies therefore retain their classical meaning. In particular, the negation symbol in rule bodies of a D-module, and therefore, the negation as failure symbol in rule bodies of GDT-programs is classical negation. After nearly 40 years of controversy on the nature of negation as failure, this can be called a surprising conclusion.
The rule operator ← in D-modules represents the sort of conditional that is found in inductive definitions in mathematical text. For example, we can phrase
as the conditional "n + 1 is even if n is not even". In the context of a definition, such a rule sounds like a material implication. However, while it indeed entails the material implication (i.e., its head must be true whenever its body is true), it is in fact much stronger than that (in particular, its head may not be arbitrarily true) and is not even a truth functional object. In particular, each rule is an "instruction" in the iterative "recipe" provided by an informal definition to construct the defined relations. This is the third kind of conditional that we encounter in this paper. In other studies of inductive definitions, this kind of conditional has also been called a production (Martin-Löf, 1971 ).
The remaining question concerns the global informal composition operator of D-modules. In mathematical text, this composition operator and the modular nature of definitions surface most clearly when an existing informal definition is extended with new cases. For instance, the syntax of modal propositional logic may be derived from that of propositional logic by a phrase such as: "We extend the definition of propositional logic with the additional case that if ϕ is a formula, then so is Kϕ". In our terminology, this natural language statement is invoking the informal composition operator of inductive definitions to add an additional rule to an existing definition. Such an additional rule has an impact on the construction process specified by the definition, and therefore also on the relation that is eventually constructed. After the addition, the defined set of formulas becomes strictly larger since more formulas can be constructed. However, the extension has a non-monotonic effect (in the sense used in the area of non-monotonic reasoning). Indeed, before the addition, the definition entailed for each propositional symbol p that Kp was not a formula; after adding the rule, the definition entails that Kp is a formula. This is a revision and neither monotone nor antimonotone.
We observe that from a logical perspective, the rule operator and the global D-module composition have very unusual properties and are truly non-classical. In themselves, they are not truth-functional. Yet, the definitions they form are -a definition expresses a particular logical relation between parameter and defined symbols that can be true or false in structures interpreting these symbols. In summary, these non-standard features do not stop human experts from understanding inductive definitions and the compositional nature of definitions, allowing them e.g., to properly judge how an additional case changes the defined concept.
How much of ASP practice is covered by OB I (·)?
The transformation to ASP-FO in Theorem 3 is equivalence preserving. Consequently, OB I (·) provides a precise informal semantics that captures the content of splittable ASP programs, under the condition that the resulting D-modules are total. Here, we assess how much of ASP practice is covered by these translations.
Theorem 3 applies to core ASP programs Π that have a proper splitting. Experience suggests that define components in GDT programs map frequently to classes of D-modules that are known to be total (non-recursive, definite, stratified, locally stratified). For example, in the Hamiltonian cycle program (7), two D-modules are non-recursive and one is negation-free. In an attempt to verify this on a broader scale, we examined benchmark programs of the 2013 ASP system competition (Alviano et al., 2013a) . In this experiment, we used an extended version of ASP-FO that supports weight constraints and aggregate expressions which occur in many practical ASP programs. The reading OB I and Theorem 3 can be generalized for this formalism (see the next section). A few of the benchmarks such as the strategic company program contain disjunction in the head; to these our theory does not apply. Other benchmarks were properly splittable and could easily be translated into ASP-FO following almost literally the embedding of Theorem 3. In most cases, we could split and apply the trivial syntactic transformations exemplified in transforming (7) to (10). Few places required more than these trivial transformations to express generate parts. Most importantly, we observed that in all our experiments, the D-modules obtained after splitting yielded total definitions. Indeed, the rule sets belonged to one of the aforementioned classes of total D-modules (non-recursive, positive, stratified or locally stratified) and they clearly expressed definitions of the head predicates in terms of the parameter symbols. Thus, OB I (·) provided a precise and correct interpretation for the benchmark programs considered.
This observation provides experimental evidence for the claim that the GDT paradigm requires only total D-modules, and that the informal semantics OB I (D) therefore suffices to cover GDT practice. A similar observation was made by Erdogan and Lifschitz (2004) , who note that [w] e expect the rules in the define part of a program to not add or remove potential solutions, but just to extend each of them by adding the defined atoms appropriately. This is obviously in keeping with our restriction to total D-modules, which have a unique stable model for each interpretation of their parameters. To ensure this property, Erdogan and Lifschitz (2004) restrict attention to D-modules without negated occurrences of defined atoms-i.e., those that correspond to monotone inductive definitions such as that of transitive closure. Using the results of Denecker and Ternovska (2008) allows us to be more general, by considering also stratified non-monotone inductive definitions such as that of the satisfaction relation. Table 8 recaps the essence of the new theory OB I of informal semantics. Here, rows 9 and 10 give the informal semantics of T-and G-modules, whereas row 11 gives the informal semantics for definitional rules for D-modules. Row 12 specifies that the informal composition operator underlying D-modules is the one underlying inductive definitions. Row 13 gives the implicit composition operator of ASP-FO itself (i.e., it explains what it means to gather a number of modules into a theory). As a comparison to Table 1 shows, the D-module composition operator (row 12) and the rule operator (row 11) are the only non-classical elements. 
(in the sense of material implication) 7 ∃x ϕ there exists an x in the universe of discourse such that OB I (ϕ) 8 ∀x ϕ for all x in the universe of discourse, OB I (ϕ)
The relations I(Def (D)) are defined in terms of I(P ar(D)) by the following (simultaneous) induction: This result states that, like an FO formula, an ASP-FO module does not impose constraints on symbols that do not appear in it, i.e., any expansion of a model of an ASP-FO module is again a model. In particular, ASP-FO has no implicit global closed world assumption (CWA).
A key property of FO is that substituting a formula ϕ for a formula ψ that is equivalent to ϕ preserves equivalence. We should hope that the same proposition holds in ASP-FO. The following theorem states this property for T-modules and G-modules.
Theorem 9 (Substitution property for G-and T-modules)
Let ψ, ϕ be two equivalent FO formulas. Let T ′ be obtained from an ASP-FO theory T by substituting any number of occurrences of ψ for ϕ in T-modules and in the bodies of rules in G-modules. Then T and T ′ have the same models.
Proof. This is a consequence of the substitution property in FO and the fact that T-modules are FO formulas and G-modules are equivalent to FO formulas through the transformation of Corollary 6. QED
The situation is less straightforward for D-modules, where the formal semantics depends on the concept of the Kleene three-valued truth assignment (Kleene, 1952) . As explained in the discussion following Definition 12, Kleene's three-valued truth assignment can be derived from the notion of the satisfaction relation for pairs of interpretations. Nevertheless, here it is useful to give the explicit definition.
LetÃ be a three-valued structure, i.e., one which interprets each predicate symbol P/n as a function from dom (Ã) n to the set of truth values {t, f, u}. We order these truth values under the truth order as f ≤ t u ≤ t t and define the complement operator f −1 = t, t −1 = f and u −1 = u.
Proceeding by induction in a similar way as in Definition 3, we define the truth value ϕÃ ,θ of a formula ϕ with respect toÃ. This definition follows Kleene's weak truth tables.
To link this definition with Definition 12, each three-valued structureÃ corresponds to a pair (A l , A u ) of two-valued structures. To obtain A l and A u fromÃ, u is mapped to f and to t, respectively. Consequently, A l represents a lower approximation of the (two-valued) structures represented by A, and A u represents an upper approximation. The relationship between ϕÃ and (ϕ (A l ,Au) , ϕ (Au,A l ) ) is given by the following correspondences: t ↔ (t, t), f ↔ (f, f), and u ↔ (f, t). The tuple (t, f) does not arise since A l ≤ t A u .
Definition 19
We call FO formulas ψ, ϕ 3-equivalent, denoted ψ ≡ 3 ϕ, if for every three-valued structureÃ interpreting all symbols of ψ, ϕ, ψÃ = ϕÃ.
Two 3-equivalent FO formulas are also equivalent since (two-valued) interpretations are a special case of three-valued interpretations. The inverse is not true and some properties of FO, such as the law of excluded middle, do not hold in three-valued logic. For instance, ⊤ (true) and ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, or ϕ and (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) are not 3-equivalent. However, most standard equivalences are also 3-equivalences:
(these are two rewritings of ϕ ⇔ ψ); − ¬∀x ϕ ≡ 3 ∃x ¬ϕ; − ¬∃x ϕ ≡ 3 ∀x ¬ϕ; − distributivity laws, commutativity and associativity laws, idempotence, etc. Proof. In (Pelov et al., 2007) , it was shown that the parametrized stable models of a D-module D can be characterized as a specific kind of fixpoints, called stable fixpoints, of the three-valued immediate consequence operator associated to D. Since any substitution of a formula by a 3-equivalent formula preserves the operator, it also preserves its stable models. Consequently, models are preserved, too. QED Thus, most standard FO transformations are equivalence preserving D-modules as well. In other words, virtually all standard "laws of thought" apply in ASP-FO: the De Morgan laws, double negation, distributivity, associativity, commutativity, idempotence. This property of ASP-FO has deep practical implications. It means that the programmer has (almost) the same freedom as in FO to express an informal proposition in ASP-FO. It also implies that the correctness of the programmer's formalization does not depend on subtleties of the formalization that go beyond common understanding.
Here is an example of a standard FO transformation that is not equivalence preserving in the context of a D-module. Since the law of excluded middle does not hold in 3-valued logic, the formulas ⊤ and P ∨ ¬P are equivalent but not 3-equivalent. Substituting the second for the first in the body of the rule of the D-module:
{P ← ⊤}
results in the non-equivalent D-module:
Indeed, the first module has a unique model {P }, while the second has no models. Thus, reasoning by cases does not in general preserve equivalence in D-modules. The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the nature of inductive definitions (and not in, e.g., the nature of negation in D-modules). Indeed, (inductive) definitions are sensitive to negated propositions in rule bodies, because such propositions constrain the order in which rules may be applied (Denecker and Vennekens, 2014) . Therefore, rewriting rule bodies while adding such propositions may disturb the rule application process in an irrecoverable way and turn a sensible definition in a non-sensible one. Denecker and Vennekens (2014) demonstrate that similar phenomenon can be observed in mathematical texts.
While this example shows that reasoning by cases cannot be applied in general, the following theorem illustrates that any equivalence preserving transformation of classical logic, including reasoning by cases, can be applied to D-module rule bodies, provided it is used with care. In particular, the transformation should not destroy the totality of the definition. Proof. Also this theorem was proven by Pelov et al. (2007) . In fact, it is a consequence of a more general property (Pelov et al., 2007 ) that if two D-modules have the same 2-valued immediate consequence operator, then the well-founded models of both may be different but they are not contradicting each other. That is: there are no atoms that are true in one and false in the other. Any application of an equivalence preserving rule on a body of a D-module obviously preserves the 2-valued immediate consequence operator. If both D-modules are total, their well-founded models are 2-valued and hence, identical. These models are also the unique stable models of the two D-modules. QED These results essentially show that we are free to apply any equivalence preserving transformation of FO to the rule bodies of a D-module, as long as we are careful not to turn the D-module into a nonsensical inductive definition.
Related Work and Discussion
This section discusses the scope of the results in this article and situates them within the ASP literature.
Extending the core ASP language A limitation of the core ASP language studied in this article is that it lacks aggregates or weight constraints. Indeed, such constructs are used in many ASP applications. Pelov et al. (2007) extend FO(ID) with aggregates. That work can be adopted "verbatim" to the case of the logic ASP-FO. Importantly, extending OB I (ϕ) to theories with aggregates is also not problematic. A clear-cut example of a D-module involving induction over aggregates is the following definition specifying that a company x controls a company y if the sum of the shares of y that x owns directly and of the shares of y owned by companies c controlled by x is more than 50%.
This is an example of a monotone inductive definition with recursion over aggregate expressions. Under the intended informal semantics for the Sum aggregate, OB I (·) produces the following informal reading of this D-module:
The relation "x controls y" is defined in terms of the relation "x holds s percent of shares in y" by the following induction:
• Consider the sum of the percentages s for companies c such that either c and x are the same and x holds s percent of shares in y or x controls c and c holds s percent of shares in y. If this sum is greater then 50, then x controls y.
This informal inductive definition provides a precise and meaningful interpretation of the recursion over an aggregate in the D-module above.
Links to other developments in ASP Pearce (1997) proposed to use the logic of Here and There (HT) as a meta-logic to study ASP semantics. Pearce's work maps an ASP program to a theory in HT and characterizes its answer sets as a specific subclass of the models of this theory, called equilibrium models. Pearce and Valverde (2004, 2005) generalized these ideas to arbitrary first order formulas. Also Ferraris et al. (2011) conservatively lifted ASP to the full FO syntax using a form of circumscription -an operator SM defined in second order logic. These characterizations proved to be useful for analyzing and extending ASP semantics. For example, the logic HT was shown to underlie the notion of strong equivalence of programs (Lifschitz et al., 2001 (Lifschitz et al., , 2007 , while the use of operator SM provided an elegant alternative to the definition of stable models of logic programs containing choice rules. The relation between these different approaches was investigated in Lin and Zhou (2011) . While these characterizations are powerful formal tools (e.g., our Theorem 3 follows from a result proved by Ferraris et al. (2011) about the SM operator), they do not in themselves directly contribute to the understanding of the informal semantics of ASP. For example, neither the informal semantics of HT nor of equilibrium logic has been developed so far. Similar arguments apply to the semantics of logic programs under operator SM, where the effect of this operator on the informal semantics of the formulas has not yet been studied.
Several features of ASP-FO also appear in other variants of ASP. As we observed earlier, the intuitive structure of a GDT-program is hidden in an ASP program. Techniques developed in ASP to cope with this include splitting to detect natural components of the program (Lifschitz and Turner, 1994; Janhunen et al., 2009; Ferraris et al., 2009) , and module systems, e.g., in (Gelfond, 2002; Oikarinen and Janhunen, 2008; Lierler and Truszczynski, 2013) .
Due to its non-Herbrand semantics, ASP-FO imposes neither Domain Closure Axiom nor the Unique Names Axiom. Thus, function symbols that are not constrained by a Herbrand module act as function symbols in classical logic. Recent extensions of ASP with similar features are open domain ASP logics such as those of Ferraris et al. (2011); Lifschitz et al. (2012) and ASP with functions (Lin and Wang, 2008; Balduccini, 2012; Cabalar, 2011) . The progression semantics of Zhang and Zhou (2010) and Zhou and Zhang (2011) also allows non-Herbrand models and makes a distinction between the intensional and extensional predicates of a theory. The ordered completion semantics (Asuncion et al., 2012) provides another way to define ASP for non-Herbrand models, which has also been extended to aggregates (Asuncion et al., 2012) . A detailed comparison with these languages would be interesting but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Well-founded versus stable semantics
Comparisons between the well-founded and stable semantics have long been the subject of discussion. Our position is that once these semantics are generalized to their parametrized versions and the internal structure of a program (in particular its define components) is identified, then the differences between both semantics disappear for practically relevant programs. They are just different mathematical formalizations for the same informal semantics: sets of clauses that define certain predicates/relations in terms of parameter symbols. However, while the two semantics are equivalent in the case of sensible (i.e., total) definitions, they are not equivalent in the case of other rule sets. The well-founded semantics identifies non-total definitions by producing a 3-valued model. In the stable semantics, nonsensical definitions are revealed by the absence of stable models or by multiple stable models. However, some programs have a unique stable model, but are not sensible definitions. For instance, the following logic program with three defined symbols a, b and f and no parameter symbols
has a unique stable model {a} but does not represent a sensible definition of a, b, and f . In practice, if ASP programmers avoid rule sets with cycles over negation, definitions are total and the two semantics coincide. The evolving GDT-programming methodology in ASP discourages cycles over negation as an encoding technique in favour of more direct representations based on the use of choice rules. This means that the debate between both semantics is losing its practical relevance.
Tools for ASP-FO and FO(ID)
ASP-FO is more than a theoretical mechanism for a semantic study of GDT programs. It is also a viable logic for which efficient tools already exist.
Similarly to FO and FO(ID), ASP-FO is an open domain logic and its models can be infinite. In general, its satisfiability problem is undecidable (and not just co-semidecidable) -this can be proved by adapting the corresponding result concerning the logic FO(ID) (Denecker and Ternovska, 2008) . In many search problems, however, a finite domain is given. That opens a way to practical problem solving. One can apply, e.g., finite model checking, finite satisfiability checking, finite Herbrand model generation or, in case the domain and data are available as an input structure, model expansion (Mitchell and Ternovska, 2005) .
Answer set programming solvers such as Smodels (Niemelä and Simons, 2000) , DLV (Leone et al., 2006) , CMODELS (Giunchiglia et al., 2006) , clasp (Gebser et al., 2007a) , and WASP (Alviano et al., 2013b) can be viewed as systems supporting a subset of ASP-FO (modulo the rewriting that we proposed). Also, ASP-FO/FO(ID) is formally an extension of Abductive Logic Programming, and hence, abductive reasoners such as the solver A-system (Kakas et al., 2001) can be seen to implement abductive reasoning for a fragment of ASP-FO/FO(ID).
Several systems have been designed with the intention to support extensions or variants of FO with rules. An early finite Herbrand model generator that supported a fragment of ASP-FO/FO(ID) was developed by East and Truszczynski (2006) . This system supports clausal logic and a set of definite Horn rules under the minimal model semantics; in our terminology this is a negation-free D-module representing a monotone inductive definition. Another solver is the Enfragmo system (Aavani et al., 2012) that supports model expansion for FO and non-recursive definitions. Both systems support aggregates. Also, Microsoft's system FORMULA (Jackson and Schulte, 2013 ) supports a form of satisfiability checking for a similar logic.
At present, the IDP system (Wittocx et al., 2008; Bruynooghe et al., 2015) offers the most complete implementation of ASP-FO as well as FO(ID). IDP is a knowledge base system that provides various forms of inference, including model expansion and Herbrand model generation. From a KR point of view, the system was developed to support essentially the GDT methodology: the representation of assertional knowledge (corresponding to G-and T-modules) and definitional knowledge (D-modules). The language supported by IDP includes FO, D-modules, aggregates, quantified existential quantifiers, multiple definitions, bounded forms of arithmetic, uninterpreted functions and constructor functions, etc. G-modules are to be "emulated" by FO formulas. A flag can be used to select the parametrized stable or well-founded semantics for rule sets; this switches the system effectively between (extensions of) ASP-FO and FO(ID).
ASP-FO and FO(ID) in a historical perspective
Originally, logic programming was seen as the Horn fragment of classical logic. This view soon became untenable due to negation as failure. One of the earliest proposed explanations was the view of logic programs as definitions. It underlied the work of Clark (1978) and Chandra and Harel (1982) . It was also present in Kowalski's book (1979) . In 1988, Gelfond and Lifschitz proposed the autoepistemic view of logic programs as a synthesis of logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning. This proposal led to the development of ELP in 1991. Note that nonmonotonic reasoning, one of the roots of ELP, had been developed fifteen years earlier as a reaction against the shortcomings of classical logic for common-sense knowledge representation.
The research direction set out by Chandra and Harel was followed up by Apt et al. (1988) and Van Gelder et al. (1991) . Although the link between logic programs and inductive definitions was at the heart of these developments, it was not made explicit. The link was strengthened again by Schlipf (1995) and later fully explicated by Denecker et al. (2001) ; it led to the logic FO(ID) Denecker and Ternovska, 2008) . Interestingly, the latter logic grew out of a semantic study of another knowledge representation extension of logic programming: Abductive Logic Programming (Kakas et al., 1992) . In ASP-FO and FO(ID), the main relict of logic programs is the D-module which is viewed as a (possibly inductive) definition. Our Tarskian perspective is a proposal to "backtrack" to the early view of logic programs as definitions. Thus, the present paper is a confluence of many research directions. ASP arose at the meeting point of two logic paradigms-nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming-that in origin were antitheses to classical logic. One of the contributions here is to reconcile ASP with the objective informal semantics of classical logic. This is the crucial step towards a synthesis of these languages, as is achieved in ASP-FO and FO(ID).
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to develop a theory of the informal semantics of ASP that:
• explains the ASP practice of GDT programming, and • matches the informal reading of an ASP expression with the informal proposition that the human programmer has in mind when he writes it.
To conduct our analysis, we presented the formalism ASP-FO, whose modular structure is geared specifically towards the GDT paradigm and in which the internal structure of GDT programs is made explicit. By reinterpreting answer sets as objective possible worlds rather than as belief sets, we obtained an informal semantics for the GDT fragment of ASP that combines modules by means of the standard conjunction, and captures the roles of different modules in GDT-based programs. This allowed us to clarify the nature of the three sorts of conditionals found in ASP, and of the negation symbol in G, D, and T-modules. In addition, the close connection between ASP-FO and FO(ID) assisted us in providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first argument for the correctness of the stable model semantics as a formalization of the concept of an (inductive) definition.
A study of a logic's informal semantics is an investigation into the foundations of the logic. We showed that explaining ASP from a Tarskian point of view has a deep impact on our view of the ASP language. All together, our study forces us to reconsider the intuitive meaning of ASP's basic connectives, it redefines ASP's position in the spectrum of logics and it shows much tighter connections with existing logics including FO and FO(ID).
